Has Deterrence Theory become obsolete in the face of events like the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

Okay, let's discuss this very interesting question.

Is the "Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention" Outdated? – Starting with the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

This question is spot-on, pinpointing a sore spot in globalization theory today. My view is: The theory isn't completely obsolete, but its limitations have been brutally exposed by events like the Russia-Ukraine war. It functions more like an "ideal model" for a more optimistic era, rather than a "universal formula" explaining all scenarios.

Let me break this down in plain language.

1. First, What Exactly is the "Dell Theory"?

This theory has a more common name: the "Golden Arches Theory" (later upgraded to the Dell Theory). It was proposed by American author Thomas Friedman in his book The World is Flat.

Think of it as a very simple life principle:

"Two partners are running a hugely successful bubble tea shop, raking in profits every day. Under such circumstances, would they be likely to get into a huge fight over some trivial matter, wreck the shop, and end their partnership?"

Highly unlikely. Because the cost of fighting is too high—the shop is lost, the money is gone, nobody gains.

The "Dell Theory" scales this logic up to the national level. Its core idea is: When two nations are deeply intertwined in the same global supply chain (e.g., both manufacturing parts for Dell computers), the likelihood of them going to war becomes extremely low. War would destroy the supply chain, causing severe economic damage to both sides – a cost neither can bear.

Simply put, it argues that "economic interdependence (‘you are in me, I am in you’) will make everyone hesitate to take rash actions." It's a form of deterrence based on economic rationality.

For decades, this theory seemed to hold true in many places. Take France and Germany in Europe: they fought for centuries, but now, as core EU members deeply integrated economically, imagining them going to war again is almost unthinkable.

2. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: A Slap in the Face?

Now, let's look at the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Before the war, was Russia part of the global supply chain? Absolutely!

It was Europe's largest supplier of natural gas and oil, a crucial link in the global energy supply chain.
Multinational companies like McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Apple, IKEA… all had significant operations in Russia.
Russia’s financial system was also tightly connected to the global SWIFT network.

According to the "Dell Theory," Europe and the US should strive to avoid conflict, fearing energy shortages and market losses; Russia should refrain from military action, fearing expulsion from the global economic system and asset freezes.

But then what happened? War broke out anyway.

Russia took action, and the West imposed devastating sanctions. Both sides have suffered immense economic losses, yet neither has backed down.

It’s as if those two bubble tea shop partners – one not only flipped the table but also beat the other into the hospital, caring little even if the shop ended up collapsing.

3. Why Did the Theory Fail Here?

This situation exposed several fatal flaws in the "Dell Theory":

Blind Spot One: It Overestimates the "Rational Economic Actor" Assumption

The theory assumes national leaders make decisions like corporate CEOs, calmly calculating costs and benefits. But reality shows that what drives state actions, beyond economics (what we might call “pragmatic gains” or "substance"), are often far stronger forces, such as:

National Security Concerns (“They’re putting weapons at my doorstep”)
Historical Sentiment and National Identity (“We were one family, you can't run off with outsiders”)
Geopolitical Ambition (“I want to restore past glory and spheres of influence”)
Leadership Personal Will and Political Legitimacy

For Russia's decision-makers, the security threat and sense of "betrayal" to national identity posed by Ukraine aligning with NATO – these costs related to "face" and "security" – far outweighed the loss of "pragmatic gains" (“substance”) from economic sanctions. When "face" clashes with "substance," some will unhesitatingly choose the former.

Blind Spot Two: "Your Perceived Cost" ≠ "His Perceived Cost"

The West believed the "deterrent" effect of economic sanctions was massive, enough to make Russia back down.

But Russia likely calculated differently:

They may have underestimated the severity and resolve behind Western sanctions.
They may have overestimated their own ability to withstand the economic blow, or thought they could counter with their energy leverage.
Most crucially, they probably concluded “the cost of inaction would be higher in the future.” If Ukraine became fully "Westernized" and joined NATO, that would represent a permanent strategic defeat for Russia – a cost far exceeding near-term economic losses.

Therefore, deterrence’s effectiveness depends not on how strong the deterring side is, but on how the deterred side perceives that strength and its own potential cost.

Blind Spot Three: Globalization Isn't "Monolithic" – It Can Be "Decoupled" From

In the era when the "Dell Theory" gained traction, globalization was widely seen as irreversible. However, the US-China trade war and the Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrate that when political and security conflicts intensify beyond a certain point, "decoupling" becomes possible.

The world can quickly shift from a "win-win cooperation" logic to a "bloc confrontation" logic. When blocs form, supply chains within each bloc strengthen, while connections between blocs are severed. Russia is now actively trying to build an economic loop independent of the West.

Conclusion: The Theory Isn't Dead, But the World is More Complex

So, back to the original question: Is the "Dell Theory," or the theory of economic deterrence, obsolete?

It can't be said to be completely obsolete, but it's certainly not universal.

During "normal times" and for most countries, economic interdependence does serve as a crucial stabilizer for peace. No normal nation wants to go to war with its largest trading partner.
However, when core state security, national dignity, or territorial sovereignty – things that are non-negotiable – are at stake, the economic ledger takes a back seat.

You can think of the "Dell Theory" as a powerful "painkiller." It can effectively mitigate and prevent many headaches (small-to-medium conflicts) caused by friction over interests. But when a nation is facing a perceived "cancer" (an existential crisis or historical opportunity), painkillers alone are useless. It may opt for drastic measures – "scraping the bone to cure the poison" or even pursuing mutually destructive ends.

The main lesson from Russia-Ukraine is this: Never underestimate the power of history, emotion, security, and ideology in international politics. The world, after all, is not a flat balance sheet.